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BOOK REVIEWS
Tim Fin:

AmEDMENT TODAY.

By Erwin N. Griswold. Cambridge)

Mass.: Harvard University Press. Pp. vi, 82. $0.50
In an age characterized by political inquisitions, loyalty purges,
condemnation by inquisition, expurgatory oaths, and other instruments
of modern cruelty devised by sick men in a sick society it is refreshing to read Dean Griswold's little book which is a defense of traditional
constitutional guarantees equally applicable to subversives of the
right or of the left. Each of the three chapters was composed and
delivered as a speech, and they have been reproduced without substantial changes. In the first chapter which deals with the selfincrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment the author traces the
development of the principle that no one is bound to accuse himself
from its origins in English law to its inclusion in the Virginia Bill
of Rights and the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution. Characterizing the privilege against self-incrimination as "one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized," Dean Griswold proceeds to evaluate the privilege as a device for the protection
of the innocent and to furnish illustrations in which the innocent may
justifiably have recourse to the constitutional right to refuse to answer
questions without at all implying guilt of crime.
In the second chapter Dean Griswold treats the concepts of law
of the land and due process of law as evolved from Magna Carta and
applies them to the conduct of congressional investigating committees.
Although he regards some recent congressional investigations as denials of due process of law, the author is convinced that the responsibility for the proper conduct of congressional investigations is clearly
in Congress collectively and in every member thereof individually.
Accordingly, he suggests a solution to the problem of investigative
procedure by the enactment of statutes to the adoption of rules of procedure which would keep legislative investigations "wholly consistent with our basic and deeply felt notions of due process of law."
Specifically, he recommends the elimination of the one-man investigating committee in proceedings where a witness appears involuntarily,
action by the whole committee in the issue of subpoenas, the guarantee
of representation by counsel, prevention of publicity of evidence except that produced in open hearings, protection of witnesses against
the contrivances of television and news cameras and recording equipment, and finally, the suppression of those investigations the basic
purpose of which is to expose people. As a sanction to these require-
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merits the author recomfmends the exemption of witnesses ffti
testifying unless these procedures are met.
In the final chapter'the author returns to the self-incrimination
clause and relates it to such factors as the nature of the question asked
and the nature of the forum or tribunal in which the question is
asked. When questions are aimed at the probing of men's minds by
legislative inquisitions which unlike courts or administrative'agencies
are bound by no procedure the author finds further justification on the
part of witnesses to refuse to answer.
Altogether Dean Griswold has produced a little volume in language
that most can understand and on basic assumptions with which no
thoughtful person aware of the basic rights and traditions of AngloAmerican legal procedure and the threats to them can take exception.
The book should be required reading fdr those minute women who
invoke superficial traditions to destroy ancient liberties, those vigilant
meri who constitute themselves as custodians of patriotism and security
to spy upon and inform about their fellow citizens, and above all members of Congress in the hope that they will curb some of their more
happy headline hunters.
ROBERT J. HAIuIs*

HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. By Charles T, McCormick. St.
Paul: West Publishing Co., 1954, pp. xxviii, 774.
The purpose of this book, as stated by Professor McCormick, "is to
give the student a preliminary view of some of the important areas
[of evidence], and to furnish the lawyer or the judge with a starting
point on some of his evidence problems." He has "attempted not
only to picture the existing practice in respect to the topics considered
but also where the rules seem defective to give [his] views as to the
changes needed for the better administration of justice." "As keys to
further research" he has provided "references to the legal periodicals,
the digests and encyclopedias, the Uniform Rules, and above all to the
Wigmore treatise." This purpose he has fulfilled in ample measure.
His discussion of the defects and the needed remedies is full and
forceful. His references to key sources are adequate. As to the legal"
periodical literature and Wigmore's treatise, he does not hesitate to
express disagreement with the various authors including the recognized master of the subject. All this means that Professor McCormick
has done the kind of first rate job that his brethren in the law teaching profession have come to expect of him. Students, teachers and
practitioners will find his discussions stimulating, whether or not they
* Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
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agree with his conclusions. The practitioner may well study them
with profit; he can check them against current decisions, for the
author's citations make the book an excellent case finder.
This review might well end here, but the prospective reader should
be informed in more detail of the content of the treatise; and the
reviewer will hardly meet expectations if he does not indicate his
opinion upon some of the problems presented in the text.
The book, which contains 37 chapters, opens with suggestions to
the student for discovering relevant evidential materials, both with
and without resort to the court, and for preparing them for trial.
Four chapters deal with the examination of witnesses, including their
impeachment and rehabilitation, with some suggestions as to tactics.
The sixth chapter covers the procedure for offering and excluding
evidence. Herein is a brief exposition of the respective functions of
judge and jury in determining issues of fact upon which the admissibility of offered evidence depends. An interesting section, "Fighting Fire with Fire," sets forth the various views as to the effect of the
reception of inadmissible evidence upon the adversary's right to meet
it with evidence having the same or a like infirmity.
Competency and privilege of witnesses and privileged communications take the next nine chapters. The author would class as
privileged all matters which are excludable principally on grounds of
social policy rather than because of lack of trustworthiness. This
causes him to add to the usual category of privileges the following:
improperly induced confessions, illegally obtained evidence, offers of
compromise, evidence of subsequent repairs, and statements made
within the scope of the agency or employment by one agent or servant
to another or to the principal or master. In dealing with the usual
privileges he approves the English ruling as to marital communications, which makes the privilege cease with the dissolution of the
marriage by death or divorce; his discussion of the lawyer-client
privilege as applied to reports of accidents made by employees to
employers or to representatives of liability insurance companies, and
his treatment of the questions raised in and by Hickman v. Taylor1 are
very helpful; the privilege against self-incrimination he thinks should
be limited and he strongly disapproves the decision in Counselman v.
Hitchcock.2 Like most teachers and commentators he condemns the
creation of any physician-patient privilege. In the chapter on Confessions he makes a careful study of the decisions holding the use of
a coerced confession in a criminal case to be a violation of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the topic of
Governmental Secrets he considers the privileges of grand jurors but
not those, if any, of petit jurors.
1. 329 U. S. 495 (1947).
2. 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
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In Chapters 16 to 20, entitled "Relevancy and its Counterweights:
Time, Prejudice, Confusion and Surprise," we find the author agreeing
with Thayer in discarding the term "legal relevancy" as contrasted
with logical relevancy; we meet the familiar problems and conflicts
of views as to evidence of character and habit and of similar happenings and transactions, and we read a sensible exposition of the
futility of attempts to frame and enforce rules designed to keep
jurors ignorant as to whether a defendant charged with negligent
injury to another carries liability insurance. The chapter on Experimental and Scientific Evidence is outstanding and furnishes
ample references to legal and non-legal literature as well as to pertinent judicial decisions.
Two chapters cover the authentication of writings and the so-called
Best Evidence Rule. Chapter 24 presents the author's views on the
Parol Evidence Rule, which emphasize its purpose of preventing
jurors from disregarding the agreement as written so as to relieve
the dishonest or mistaken litigant from the enforcement of what has
turned out to be a bad bargain. References to Williston, Wigmore
and Corbin enable the reader to judge for himself the extent to which
this emphasis is approved by other distinguished commentators. If,
as the courts declare, the objective of the rule is to afford the parties
to the transaction assurance of its stability by reducing its terms
to writing, it would certainly be difficult to find another rule the objective of which may be so easily defeated by legal devices readily
available to the crooked or crafty litigant.
In the ten chapters devoted to the hearsay rule and its exceptions the
author agrees with most commentators in classifying reported testimony and admissions as hearsay, but, unlike them, he includes also
memoranda of past recollected, which Thayer described as artificial
refreshment of memory and Wigmore calls past recollection recorded.
His treatment of the more important exceptions is adequate, and he
continues to exert his influence to have contemporaneous statements
entitled to reception in evidence equally with spontaneous statements. His suggestions for proposed liberalizing legislation deserve
very careful consideration, and it is to be hoped that his optimism
as to the future of this segment of the subject is justified. The book
closes with chapters on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, and
Judicial Notice.
On the whole Professor McCormick's discussion of the problems on
the solution of which judges and commentators have disagreed is so
adequate, though brief, and his conclusions are so close to those which
I should have reached that comment would not be worth while.
There are a few topics, however, as to which an expression of my
opinion may be warranted.
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1. I should have liked to have his views as to fthe test for admissibility of hearsay which the modern decisions seem to be setting up. He
points out the verbal insistence of the courts upon oath and opportunity for cross-examination as the controlling requisites, but he
persuasively argues for a revaluation of cross-examination as an instrument for the discovery of the truth in a litigated case. In each exception to the hearsay rule he notes the circumstances which are
deemed sufficient to distinguish the evidence from ordinary hearsay
--circumstances which are often said to constitute a guaranty of
trustworthiness, but which usually could at most serve only as a
subjective stimulus to truth-telling in place of an oath, and in many
instances indicate only a lack of motive or opportunity to falsify. I
gather that he is inclined to agree with the judges in Wright v.
Tatham,3 that the fundamental reason for exclusion is distrust of
the capacity of jurors to put a fair value upon hearsay; and that under
our adversary system this means that a party has the right not to be
exposed to the risk which their lack of capacity would create.
If this is so, then his treatment of the division of function between
judge and jury on questions preliminary to the admissibility of
hearsay seems somewhat inadequate. This theory of exclusion requires that the jurors shall be given only such materials for decision
as in the opinion of the judge they can fairly evaluate. The usual generalization, accepted by Wigmore, that all questions of fact preliminary
to the admissibility of evidence are to be answered by the judge, is'
both inaccurate and misleading. Its application where the objection
is based on conditional relevancy; the refusal of many, if not most,
American courts to apply it where the preliminary question is identical
with an ultimate question for the jury; its total abandonment by the
New York courts in dealing with Confessions and its modification in
some other states in all criminal cases-these and related problems
growing out of them, the consideration of which reach the very roots
of the exclusionary rule, need ventilation, and an exposition of Professor McCormick's views, though brief, would have been helpful
to those teachers and students and those judges and lawyers who are
interested in attempting to make our law of evidence an instrument
for rational investigation of disputes of fact.
2. As to burden of proof and presumptions I regret that he did not
develop at some length (a) his briefly stated opinion, that the burden
of going forward with evidence has much more practical importance
than the burden of persuasion, and (b) his oblique implication, that
the dogma that the latter burden never shifts, if properly understood,
would be harmless if not meaningless. As every trial lawyer fully
realizes, in order to make proper preparation, counsel must know
3. 5 Clark &Finnelly 670 (1838).
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in advance of trial upon what issue or issues he must be the first to
offer evidence sufficient to get to the jury. On the other hand, neither
counsel nor judge need determine which party must carry the burden
of persuasion until the evidence is closed, for only then will counsel
have to frame his final argument and the judge determine the final
content of his instructions. Professor McCormick expresses no strong
dissent, if any, from the arbitrary rule that the burden of persuasion
is fixed by the pleadings. He does not, so far as I could observe, discuss
the effect of this rule if combined in application with the rules, supported by both Thayer and Wigmore, that the sole function of a
presumption is to fix the burden of going forward with evidence
sufficient to justify a finding of the non-existence of the presumed
fact and that the burden of persuasion never shifts. Of course, he
disagrees with the Thayer-Wigmore view as to the effect of a presumption, and this, I suggest, should affect his attitude toward using
the pleadings as a basis for allocating the burden of persuasion.
Whatever may have been true as to the coincidence of burden of
pleading and burden of persuasion in the days when each issue had to
be evolved by assertion and denial, it is certain that the burdens were
not coincident in the later development of the common law action of
trespass on the case and actions which grew out of it. It never was,
and is not now, true under the Codes, which cut off the pleadings with
the reply or with the answer, for many issues have to be tried which
are not disclosed in the pleadings. Under the most modern system,
the pleadings are of minor importance in defining the issues for trial.
Consequently, any rule as to the allocation of the burden of persuasion
based upon the notion that the issues are revealed by the pleadings
should be abandoned.
Furthermore the Thayer-Wigmore concept of the operation of a
presumption entirely disregards the reasons which govern the allocation of the burden of persuasion. Most modern courts agree with
Wigmore that there is no controlling a priori test, but that the allocation is governed by considerations of fairness, convenience and policy
as disclosed in judicial experience. If so, it is absurd to fix the burden
upon the hypothetical situation posed in the pleadings, instead of the
situation disclosed by the evidence-the situation with which the
jury or other trier of fact has to deal. Otherwise, if the trier's mind is
in equilibrium upon the issue, the party who should win on the
evidence which leaves the trier unconvinced must lose because the
pleadings set forth an inconsistent non-ekistent state of fact. Thus
where a plaintiff's allegation that he is the legitimate son of X is
met by a denial, he has the burden of persuading the trier to find
that such is the case, for the trier knows nothing about the relationship between the plaintiff and X or any other person. When it be-
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comes established in the case that X was the legal husband of W
at the time of the conception and birth of plaintiff and that she is his
mother, the situation with which the trier is to deal in considering
evidence bearing on plaintiff's legitimacy is entirely different, and the
considerations which justified placing the burden on plaintiff are no
longer applicable, and to treat the case as if they were still applicable
is patently irrational. The burden of persuasion should be fixed in the
light of the situation as it is at the time the case is submitted to the
trier. If this is done, obviously the burden once placed will never
shift.
3. In some respects I cannot go along with the author's classification of privileged communications. His arguments to support his contention that an improperly induced confession is excluded because
considerations of social policy outweigh those which demand the use
of all available reliable evidence in the determination of any single
controversy leave me unconvinced. If the hearsay rule rests upon
the theory that the jury is unable to evaluate fairly the excluded utterance, that reason seems to me applicable to an improperly induced
confession. The Court said in Warickshall's Case4 that such a confession "comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be considered
as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it." No
doubt many an inadmissible confession is true; likewise, there is no
doubt that many an inadmissible hearsay statement is true. The
consideration that jurors are likely to put an improper value upon
an improperly induced confession will justify making it an exception
to the rule which admits against a party evidence of any relevant
conduct on his part, whether or not it has any indicium of verity.
The exclusion on the basis of unreliability is in accord with the numerous decisions which receive evidence of matter shown by the
testimony to have been found as a result of an improperly induced
confession. A goodly number also admit those parts of the confession
thus corroborated, and Wigmore approves the statutory rule in Texas
that admits the whole of the confession on the ground that the corroboration overcomes the likelihood of its falsity.
Again, I should hestitate to accept the concept that relevant statements made by one agent or servant to another or to his principal or
master within the scope of the agency or employment are privileged.
Certainly they have guaranties of trustworthiness and certainly they
fall without the doctrine of respondeat superior, which has its justification in social policy. But where both the principal or master and
the agent or servant are competent and compellable as witnesses to
the matter which the statements concern, there is little or no reason
in policy for creating or recognizing a privilege. Such statements, if
4. Leach's Crown Cas., 248 (1783).
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they are entries in the regular course of business, are admissible
wherever relevant; the same is true if they fall within any other
recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Many hearsay statements
having equally cogent elements of verity are excluded simply because they do not meet the requirements of any recognized exception.
4. When Professor McCormick and I were laboring together with
others on the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence, I
should have agreed generally with his views upon the privilege
against self-incrimination. I should have questioned the desirability
of the result in Counselman v. Hitchcock.5 I still think that an accused who is fairly charged with an offense, who is represented by
able counsel, who is tried in open court in public by a fairly chosen
jury, who is protected against the use of improperly induced confessions, and is entitled to confrontation by the witnesses against him,
should have no privilege to refuse to answer any relevant questions
put to him at the trial, and that his refusal to do so should be the basis
of any reasonable inference against him. But only so long as these
safeguards are furnished in fact as well as in form. What has happened abroad in public trials conducted with all the requisite formalities, and what has happened in this country in administrative proceedings where the result is not punishment for crime but one which
carries consequences much worse than those which ordinarily follow
conviction of a felony, give me pause. What may happen in times of
crisis, when jurors almost invariably reflect the prejudices of the
community, when too many trial judges are not vigilant to protect
the accused from unfair tactics of overzealous prosecutors; what may
be done by conscientious men who believe that the prime function of
government when its very existence seems to them to be attacked
is self-preservation regardless of individual rights-these make me
fearful of any limitation of the privilege, and I welcome the decisions
of the Supreme Court which seem to extend its protection. I believe
the Justices to be wise who look behind the facade and see that the
purpose of a question harmless on its face may have for its objective
the disclosure of facts which will be evidence of one of the now
numerous statutory crimes quite unconnected with the offense charged.
I welcome too the decisions which hold the privilege applicable to
the questioning of suspected persons by the police, who in fact are
thereby conducting official investigations and assuming the functions
of the early committing magistrates in England. So'far from contract-

ing the scope of the privilege, I should extend it to cover every situation where the dangers which justify its persistence are present.
By expressing dissent from some of the views of Professor McCormick I do not intend to imply that they are unreasonable or
5. Note 2, supra.
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that they detract from the value of his treatise. In saying that a
fuller discussion of some of the problems would have been desirable,
I do not desire to suggest that he did not have sound practical reasons
for the abbreviated treatment. While I do not mean to leave the impression that I accept without qualification the portions of the text
upon which I have not commented, I end by reasserting the opinion
expressed in the first paragraph of this review. It is a first class work.
E. M. MORGAN*
* Frank C. Rand Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.

